The Evolution of Political Violence in Guatemala

Political violence as a means to propagate and maintain the status quo in Guatemala is historical and structural in nature. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three periods in which human rights violations in general, and repressive acts in particular, intensified based on the requirements of different counterinsurgency strategies implemented in the country beginning in 1954. Sociologist Carlos Figueroa Ibarra points out that a "constant of terror that is structural by nature," exists in Guatemala, as well as periodic episodes of intense, mass terror which are called "waves of terror." The first wave of terror occurred during the counterrevolution of 1954, the second between 1967 and 1971, and the third between 1978 and 1983 (Figueroa; 1990).

Figueroa remarks that, during these waves of terror, political violence essentially consisted of state terror exercised against the vast majority of the population in order to propagate and maintain the existing social order. In each "wave of terror" the State’s main objective was to create a sort of passive consensus. In other words, eliminate the tendency toward change from the heart of the population (Figueroa; 1990).

This study examines the political context in which the third wave of terror, from 1978 to 1983, emerged and evolved. It also traces the social processes and movements preceding and following it, so as to define and identify similarities and differences in government counterinsurgency policies and strategies and in methods of terror.

Violence as a Tool of Political Power

Violence as a form of governing was institutionalized by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas’ government, following the defeat of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, as a means of obliterating all vestiges of the 1944 Revolution. However, it was during the 1963 coup d’etat lead by Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia that a national counterinsurgency policy was designed. The inability of the army to contend with an armed insurgency that had emerged in the northeastern part of the country at the end of 1962 obliged the new government to request support and assistance from the United States. The counterinsurgency strategy developed around the National Security Doctrine, which involved reshaping the operational structure of the army in function of territorial coverage and control.

This sudden structural change also increased the army’s quota of power. From there, it took little time to achieve political hegemony in the country and then seek alliances with traditionally powerful economic sectors. In this way, actual cliques of politicians and businessmen emerged who aligned themselves with the army’s positions.

Counterinsurgency as a doctrine and a strategy has followed a long and complex development and adaptation process based on the socio-political and economic characteristics of the period and the government’s requirements in terms of territorial control.

In its first phase, during the government of Peralta Azurdia in the early sixties, this strategy was applied with the advice and involvement of the United States, mainly through: training of Guatemalan officials and troops; the provision of weapons and equipment appropriate for an irregular war, and the immediate support of nearly one thousand "Rangers" and "Green Berets" (Arias: 1984). This counterinsurgency strategy was developed as a pilot program for Latin America and it reached full strength during the administration of Julio Cesar Méndez Montenegro, who governed from 1966 to 1970. During this period the practice of forced disappearance emerged as a component of the government’s policy of repression.

From 1962 to 1969, repression was concentrated in the northeastern part of the country, primarily the departments of Zacapa and Izabal, where numerous villages were destroyed by aerial bombardments. Meanwhile, grassroots and revolutionary leadership was eliminated from the urban centers through assassinations committed by large groups of civilians armed by the army, who would later become known as "Death Squads." It is estimated that nearly thirty thousand people were murdered from 1963 to 1969, and thousands more were disappeared or sent into exile (Arias: 1984).

During the same period, after reversals in Vietnam, the United States embarked on a period of evaluation and readjustment of its political and military strategy vis-à-vis local conflicts. As a result, its proposals for the next decade led it to reject the most critical elements of the "National Security Doctrine." In the case of Guatemala, this change in North American foreign policy was apparent in the military aid cut-off in 1977. Nonetheless, with the approval of Washington, this support was quickly substituted primarily by Israel, Taiwan, and Argentina (AVANCSO: 1990).

Army Consolidation Within the Power Structure (1970-1977)

During this period, the Guatemalan government concluded the phase that had begun with the coup d’etat of 1963. The incorporation of the National Security Doctrine into the politics of the country highlighted the government hereditary features, particularly during the final two years of government of General Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio (1970-1974) and the entire administration of Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García (1974-1978). From this standpoint, the exclusive and concentrated economic model sustained by the dominant sectors grew and expanded, its effects reaching the majority of the population, and particularly the indigenous.

During this period, the army consoldiated its hegemony of managing the country, broadening its ability to control, administrate, and implement state plans and counterinsurgency policy. This form of governance led to the formation of powerful civilian-military groups through which political parties and other institutions helped legitimize military hegemony. In some cases, important groups of civilians linked to the economic and political right played a significant role in managing governmental affairs and ultimately, in planning and developing government policies.

Institutional Chaos and Military Governments (1973-1983)

This period begins with the fraudulent elections that brought to the Presidency General Romeo Lucas García, who governed from 1978 to 1982. In late 1981 and early 1982, differences surfaced among the groups closest to Lucas García and private enterprise. At the heart of the discord was the risk of a successful grassroots insurrection in the context of growing insurgent activity throughout Central America. Other factors included the downturn in the national economy, pillaging by military cliques, human rights violations, and international isolation. Finally, with the electoral fraud of March 7, 1982, some sectors within the army, aligned with civilian officials of the extreme right, intended to remain in power by installing as president General Aníbal Guevara, Lucas’s defense minister. In other words, the pact of traditional alliance between the economic oligarchy and these military sectors was broken.

In addition to these factors, the United States government felt that the Lucas regime had proved unable to defeat the insurgency through the development of the program known as "Pacification and Eradication of Communism." This program had been adapted for Guatemala jointly by U.S. advisors and Guatemalan army officials and was based on a U.S. proposal incorporating the counterinsurgency experiences of Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (Barahona: 1984).

Meanwhile, the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua and the achievements of the Salvadoran insurgency redefined Central America as an "area of strategic interest"for the United States. The U.S. government needed to find a solution that permitted the resumption of military aid to Guatemala, but in a different context than that under the Lucas regime, which had been completely discredited in domestic and international public opinion (Jonas: 1994).

With the replacement, in the March 23, 1982 coup d’etat, of Lucas and his closest aides, including then-Government Minister Donaldo Alvarez Ruíz, the army high command was able to reshape the state apparatus, giving it a more clearly defined and, most importantly, more effective, counterinsurgency quality. As will be seen below, almost immediately after Ríos Montt took power, a series of decrees were enacted in an attempt to create a legal facade for the policy of terror that was being implemented in the country.

In this framework, military operations in rural areas increased, resulting in a series of massacres and widespread destruction levied against the civilian population ostensibly with the objective of restoring government influence in areas controlled by the armed insurgency. After thirty months, this strategy, crafted to block the spread of the insurgency, had caused one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the country, especially for the indigenous population.

According to the strategy as designed, the Ríos Montt regime had played the role it had been assigned. Consequently, after having "cleaned up"and restored control over most of the strategic zones, it was time to begin a period of "return to normality." Following significant discord with the military high command over his intention of remaining in power, and entrenched in an authoritarian structure buttressed by religious and moralistic discourse, Ríos Montt was replaced by his Defense Minister, General Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores on August 8, 1983.

Although Mejía furthered the overall strategy that had been planned years before, some of the more extreme measures were relaxed or discontinued, among them the Special Forum Tribunals. This was also the case for some of the other excesses implemented by Ríos Montt such as the scorched earth policy. Psychological operations took on greater significance since one of the objectives of this counterinsurgency phase was to consolidate "pacification" and military field positions, and develop a program of institution-building that would give the government the political and financial capacity to continue its counterinsurgency policy.

The goals of this plan were two-fold: the first was to design a foreign policy to consolidate the achievements of the military offensives through the political neutralization of the insurgency --internally and externally -- and, to break the government’s international isolation and recover the political and economic support, mainly from Europe, that had been lost during the Lucas and Ríos Montt regimes. The second goal was to implement an internal and external political and ideological offensive, rationalized by a discourse of internal and regional pacification, and based on the principle of "active neutrality" vis-à-vis regional conflicts (AVANCSO: 1990).

The following figure presents the structure of the Guatemalan army during the seventies and early eighties, until it was changed in 1982.

Figure 2
Structure of the Guatemalan army during the "National Security" phase

Source: Guatemalan Army: 1973

"Return to Democracy" (1984-1986)

Following the reduction of military pressure in the conflicted areas and the reshaping of its operative structure, the military regime turned its attention to a new campaign plan which was launched in 1984. One of the primary objectives of this plan, known as "Institutional Engagement" [Reencuentro Institucional] was the return to the rule of law. To this end, the army called for the election of a National Constituent Assembly which would write a new Political Constitution that would lead to the return to democracy. Simultaneously, the plan sought to reduce international pressure regarding human rights issues.

Hand in hand with these measures, repression remained a constant under the Mejia Victores regime. However, it was maintained through low profile actions such as intelligence operations, surveillance, and threats. There were also selective kidnapping, disappearances, and assassinations aimed at exerting control over emerging grassroots organizations hoping to reestablish themselves after having been decapitated in prior years.

During the Mejia government, a number of human rights organizations were founded made up of family members and survivors of political violence. In 1984, the first of these publicly emerged, GAM. It was composed of family members of the detained-disappeared, especially student, union, peasant, and grassroots leaders active in processes to organize and articulate demands, processes that had been dismantled during the last "wave of terror."

GAM’s claims focused on the demand for the return alive of the hundreds of husbands, fathers, and sons of the women who made up the overwhelming majority of the organization. Jointly with other organizations, such as UNSITRAGUA that emerged afterward, and the reemergence of the Association of University Students (AEU), the demands broadened to include complete respect for human rights, and the search for truth to hold the material and intellectual authors of the terror in Guatemala accountable for their actions.

The struggle for respect for human rights, during this period when a supposed political opening allowed for the participation of such groups, also produced its first victims. These included GAM leaders Héctor Gómez Calito and Rosario Godoy de Cuevas who were kidnapped, tortured and executed by the military regime. It is important to point out that in response to national and international pressure to respect human rights, the Mejia Victores government developed an ideological campaign to discredit the activities of the above-mentioned organizations.

This period concluded with the elections of 1985 when Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo took office. In January 1986, his administration began by embracing the project that the army had promoted during previous years. Cerezo, once a victim of threats and attempts on his life under the regime of General Romeo Lucas, had maintained links to certain sectors of the army since the seventies.

During the civilian government of the Christian Democrats, with the spaces opened up by GAM and UNSITRAGUA, other organizations were formed by groups of victims of government repression. These included: The National Coordinator of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA), The Council of Ethnic Communities "Runujel Junam" (CERJ), and the Council of Displaced Persons of Guatemala (CONDEG); the Committee of Peasant Unity (CUC) also reemerged at this time.

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