Nebaj, El Quiche

The municipality of Nebaj is located in northwestern El Quiché department and, with the municipalities of Chajul and Cotzal, forms the Ixil region. It has a surface area of 607 square kilometers and, in 1981, had a population of 18,134 inhabitants, of which 87.7 per cent were indigenous, nearly all of them of the Ixil socio-linguistic group. More than three-fourths of the population -- 75.23 per cent -- lived in rural areas, and 82.89 per cent of the population was illiterate. Men made up 49.35 per cent of the total population and women 50.65 per cent (DGE: 1981).

Other estimates indicated that, in 1990, the municipality had a population of 46,637, of which 49 per cent were women and 92 per cent were indigenous (ASIES: 1992). Population density was 76.83 inhabitants per square kilometer and 77 per cent of the total population lived in rural areas. The most recent information is taken from Population Census X of 1994 which places the total population of Nebaj at 33,795 inhabitants (INE: 1995).

The Ixil region was virtually unknown to the rest of the country up until the end of the nineteenth century (see Map 6). This longstanding isolation was broken at the beginning of the twentieth century with the arrival of a group of Spaniards, expelled after Cuban independence, who settled mostly in the Nebaj area. Some years later, as a result of the Mexican revolution, a group of Mexicans also settled in the region. From the outset, both groups monopolized political power and accumulated wealth through their business ventures, and from the production and sale of coffee (EGP: 1983).

The involvement of the indigenous population in the coffee production process changed the social dynamics of the region. Since that time, the Ixils have formed part of the huge migratory currents toward the south of the country. However, it was the lack of lands that brought antagonisms in the regional social structure to the surface.

Map 6
Location of Nebaj, El Quiché

Source: CIIDH

In addition to economic exploitation characterized by precarious work conditions and low salaries offered by regional landowners, political oppression and socio-cultural exclusion led to numerous revolts that were violently suppressed. In 1936 a significant portion of Nebaj’s population rebelled against the Ubico government, demanding the revocation of vagrancy laws (EGP: 1983).

One of the main sources of wealth in Nebaj has been the contracting of cheap labor to harvest coffee on the Coast. In the early seventies, twenty-eight individuals, both indigenous and ladino, controlled this business for the entire municipality. Each one earned a monthly income of between five thousand and twenty thousand quetzales (approximately U.S. $800-3,500). In 1975 alone, more than 55,000 local residents were hired in Nebaj to go to the coastal farms. This ongoing exploitation and mistreatment motivated church base communities to denounce the situation and foster organization in the communities to confront unjust practices.

Further, beginning in the late sixties, an important cooperative movement formed in Nebaj that promoted community organization around common interests. The level of participation achieved meant that several of the cooperatives secured significant quotas of power at a municipal and regional level. This enabled them to confront the dominant sectors in search of better working conditions and fair prices for their products.

Very soon, the population was divided between those who organized and supported the demands of the majority and those supported the commercial and contracting sector which saw its business interests threatened by the consciousness-raising process sweeping the region and the municipality. To defend these interests, in 1973, the dominant groups -- composed primarily of indigenous and ladino landowners, businesspeople, and contractors -- requested for the first time the presence of government troops. They argued that communists were present who "...are fighting against us with cooperatives and other ridiculous things..." (EGP: 1983).

In addition to grassroots organizing in the area, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) embarked on the phase of establishing its support base. After intense political work beginning in 1972 forming its social base in the Ixcán, the insurgents sought to expand into the Ixil region. One of the insurgent military actions that had political impact was the 1975 assassination of landowner Luis Arenas, known as the "Tiger of the Ixcán," who had been accused of exploiting and abusing peasants in the area.

An increase in violent acts followed, perpetrated by armed groups serving area landowners. In November 1975, powerful groups requested anew an army presence in Nebaj to "finish off the guerrillas in the town, since they are pure Catholics, pure Cubans..." (EGP: 1983).

In this context, the Ixil region was hit early on by government repression, applied systematically beginning in March 1976, when a detachment of Mobile Military Police (PMA) was installed permanently. After that, there were successive military occupations of communities and aerial bombardments of the mountainous areas (EGP: 1983).

Until 1980, violent actions in Nebaj fell within the overall strategy that was being applied elsewhere in the country at the time. It was based on intelligence operations to identify and eliminate presumed "enemies of the state." In Nebaj, this was supported by conservative individuals and groups assigned to draw up "black lists" and turn them over to the army. The mass murders began in 1980 when twelve women were assassinated in the town’s central plaza (EGP: 1983).

In 1980, as part of the counterinsurgency strategy, the army developed an action plan to assert control over the population in the Ixil area through civic operations implemented by all government agencies present in the region and coordinated by the army’s Civilian Affairs Division (S-5). This plan, called "Operation Ixil" was to be implemented by February 28, 1982, and its objective was to reinforce the military mission of the command in the PUMA Theatre of Operations, with the purpose of "contributing to the restoration of law and order, rescuing the civilian, non-combatant population to [return them to] the way of life of the Guatemalan nation" (Cifuentes: 1982).

"Operation Ixil" had two phases and involved thirteen government agencies. It included activities in the areas of public health, law, finances, education, labor, social welfare, economy, commerce and industry, agriculture, communications, and public works. Simultaneously, it contemplated that military operations should "...have eliminated the subversive groups operating in the area," and completely organized the civil patrols during the first phase. At the same time, repressive actions increased markedly during the ensuing months.

In April 1981, sixty-eight people were massacred in the village of Cocob. In September, as part of the strategic offensive "Operation Ceniza," army troops massacred thirty-five people and leveled the villages of Xeucalbitz and Sumal. They also murdered twenty people in the village of Tzalbal and completely destroyed the Río Azul community. The following testimony provides some details about one of the operations, conducted in April 1981 in the community of Acul, Nebaj, El Quiché:

These and other massacres in the area were documented in more detail by anthropologists Shelton Davis and Julie Hodson in a report produced by Oxfam America in 1982 (Cifuentes: 1982; Davis and Hodson: 1982).

The heightened intensity and scope of violent acts during this phase was consistent with the new operating method of the army, which was trying to create free-fire zones. On the one hand, the detachments in municipal seats, with stationary troops, executed civic operations and served as logistical support to the mobile forces. The execution of repressive actions was allotted to the Task Forces that constantly patrolled in the zone.

The testimony of a survivor who was captured and tortured in Nebaj, El Quiché, on November 17, 1983, includes elements that reveal certain aspects of the structure of the military operations and the possible functions of different army units located in surrounding areas. The detainee was taken from the Patrol Base in Nebaj for interrogation at the Patrol Base in the municipality of Sacapulas, El Quiché. It is important to point out that when he was captured, the witness was a catechist, and member of the pro-improvement committee and village council.

In the Ixil region, army units generally launched their operations from mobile bases that came from the Ixcán, in northern El Quiché, Aguacatán and Chiantla, Huehuetenango, in the west and Uspantán, El Quiché, in the south (AVANCSO: 1992). Ground operations were frequently combined with aerial bombardment or strafing of communities or their corn crops (CITGUA: 1989). The following testimony supplied by a victim of the massacre and occupation of Parramos, Nebaj, El Quiché, on August 31, 1982, contains information regarding displacement and the operating methods of the military units:

The offensives in Nebaj and the Ixil region almost completely destroyed the twenty-six villages and 145 hamlets existing in 1980 (CITGUA: 1989). It is estimated that this zone produced 80 per cent of the internally displaced between 1981 and 1982 (AVANCSO: 1992).

In addition to the strategic objectives of asserting social and political control over the population through violence and the imposition of new organizational structures (civil patrols, military commissioners, pro-improvement committees, etc.) the army sought to prevent the population from participating in any type of social organization it [the army] did not control. This was accomplished through different types of violations against the integrity of the people as described by several witnesses who, in general, provide very precise details regarding the victim’s identity, the perpetrators, and the types of violence used.

In summary, the strategic offensives launched in July 1981 and ending in July 1983 combined military aspects with ideological, social, political, and cultural aspects by brutal means. The data presented is preliminary information obtained through field research which partially reflects the results of the political violence in the municipality of Nebaj, El Quiché, between July 1981 and June 1984.

Table 1.1 shows six types of violations during this period, culled from testimonies. The figures reflect an increase in violent acts coinciding with the military operations described earlier. It is noteworthy that there are fewer reports of these types of violations during the period from July to December 1981. This can be explained by the fact that, during that period, "Operación Ceniza" was launched and its military operations were concentrated in Chimaltenango and southern El Quiché, as well as other areas in the western part of the country.

In this framework, the next stage of this offensive, and its sequel, "Victoria 82," occurred during the ensuing eighteen months. This is demonstrated by the information supplied by witnesses especially during the period between January and June 1982. The second half of 1983 shows a decrease in the number of reported violations. This coincides with the next phase of the counterinsurgency strategy which, at that time, included the development of the campaign plan "Firmeza 83" and sought to regroup the displaced population in Model Villages and Development Poles.

Table 1.1
Nebaj, El Quiché
Number of Victims of Different Types of Violation, by Semester

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH

In the first period mentioned, the testimonies exemplify the military operations associated with "Operación Ixil." In contrast, the media did not report them to the fullest extent, mostly due to the difficulty in gaining access to primary sources of information at the time. Priest and sociologist Ricardo Falla, in his report to the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, warned of the difficulty in obtaining "first hand" information from that part of the country. He added that the two cases of massacres in the Ixil region, publicized in 1982, were committed by the Rios Montt government with the intention of blaming the insurgents (Falla: 1984).

In the second of the two periods mentioned, witnesses emphasize the social costs of "Firmeza 83" which also included the physical elimination of those who resisted capture. The contrast between testimonial evidence and that found in some documents may be due in large part to the disinformation coming from government. Official publicity introduced the Development Poles as the culmination of the army’s efforts to pacify the country, describing one of them as "a small paradise where the exodus was halted," (DIDE: 1985).

Information published by the army indicates that by 1985, 10,221 people had been concentrated in Development Poles in the Ixil region (DIDE: 1985). According to information supplied by witnesses, it is possible to surmise that the forty-five deaths reported between July and December 1983, including multiple murders, individual murders, and corpses discovered, are the result of these "pacification" operations and the relocation of the displaced population during the first months of "Firmeza 83."

The often significant discrepancies between testimonial sources and documents, as stated earlier, is explained by two fundamental factors: official disinformation or "ideological warfare" and the censorship imposed by Rios Montt in April 1982 through Decree 9-82 which prohibited the publication of news related to political violence, in general, and the armed conflict in particular.

The information summarized in Table 1.1 demonstrates that the massacres or mass murders, also called multiple murders, were the type of violation accounting for the highest number of victims during the period studied. The figures lead one to believe that the use of terror in the region was open and large-scale, at least during the second half of 1980 when selective and clandestine methods predominated in the rest of the country. The intensity and scope of government repression of the Ixil population early on was initially in response to the EGP’s efforts to establish itself in the area beginning in 1975. Later it was a response to the growth of Catholic Church base movements and cooperative organizations -- from the early seventies on -- that lead the population to organize into usually adversarial entities promoting specific demands.

Graph 2 shows the intervals defined by the relationship between intensity and time period, for this repressive method. In other words, the peaks that reflect the first halves of 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984.

Graph 2
Nebaj, El Quiché
Numbers of Victims of Multiple Murders, by Semester

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 1.1

According to the information in Table 1.1 and illustrated by Graph 2, the commission of massacres in Nebaj was not limited to a specific period of time as in other regions of the country, although from January to June 1982, during "Victoria 82," the increase in massacres and victims is obvious.

Another view of the widespread use of terror in the area is obtained by analyzing the percentages of total victims that were caused by multiple murders or massacres during each period. In Graph 3, three bars are taller than the rest. The first, equivalent to 25.6 per cent of the victims corresponds to the period between January and June 1981. This coincides with the military operations by the "Cumarcaj" (sic) Task Force operating since the beginning of the decade in El Quiché department.

The bar corresponding to January-June 1982 during the offensive "Victoria 82" represents slightly more than one fourth of the victims, 26.7 per cent. For the following period, a decrease to 12.4 per cent of the victims is observed, which could be due to the combination of military operations with the developmental phase of the counterinsurgency strategy that attempted to "win over" the population through programs such as "Guns and Beans" ["Fusiles y Frijoles"].

The bar for January-June 1983, accounting for 14.7 per cent of the victims, would have occurred during "Firmeza 83." The percentage of victims during this period indicates that the objectives of the military campaign plan were not limited to "recovery" as it claimed.

Graph 3
Nebaj, El Quiché
Victims of Multiple Murders by Semester (%)

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 1.1

After looking at the relationship between massacres and numbers of victims, the following tables and graphs illustrate more specific information that offers some basis for understanding the logic of the criteria used to apply violence. Table 1.2 summarizes data on the percentage of males who were victims of different types of violations for each of the periods studied.

Table 1.2
Nebaj, El Quiché
Percentage Male of Victims by Semester and by type of Violation

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH; based on Table 1.1

Graph 4 demonstrates the percent of all victims who were male among those killed in both massacres and individual incidents. This relationship is explained by the fact that, in Guatemala, men have a much greater level of public participation than women. In rural areas, nearly all social, public spaces are occupied by men, while women are relegated to the domestic realm. This is reflected in all social relations including, in this case, political repression.

The relatively low percentage of men, and thus the percentage of women killed in massacres during the second half of 1983 and the first half of 1984 is interesting. Note that the line representing the proportion masculine for multiple murders dips substantially below 50% during the second semester of 1983, and rises only slightly in the following semester. This could be due to the fact that, after the large-scale military operations of previous years, the men in the community had fled to the mountains or to other parts of the country while the women and children remained behind.

It can also be observed that the relation between men and women killed do not differ as widely in cases of multiple murders or massacres due to the indiscriminate nature of this type of repression. In the case of individual murders, the differences are much greater given the criteria of selectivity that emphasized the elimination of organizational and community leadership, which was principally male, as stated earlier.

Graph 4
Nebaj, El Quiché
Percentage Masculine by Semester

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 1.2

Another important aspect in characterizing the counterinsurgency strategy of the eighties is the age of the victims. Table 1.3 shows that even using presumably selective criteria, the perpetrators did not spare children, the elderly, men, or women. Nonetheless, most of the victims appear to have been people with some potential for social participation, since they belonged to the age group of the working population: between seventeen and sixty years old.

Table 1.3
Nebaj, El Quiché
Number of Victims by Age Category and Type of Violation

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH; based on Table 1.1

An analysis of the bars in Graph 5 demonstrates the strikingly indiscriminate nature of open, large-scale terror, with the killing of a numerous minors during the massacres. Other types of violations, because of their inherent objectives, specifically targeted adults. Further, although the figures of elderly people assassinated are low for this study, they also to some extent reflect possible criteria of arbitrariness in the use of terror.

Graph 5
Nebaj, El Quiché
Number of Victims by Age Range

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 1.3

In some of the testimony gathered, murders or other types of violations perpetrated against young people or the elderly are described, demonstrating possible criteria toward the indiscriminate the use of terror. An example is a case that occurred in the village of Bicalamá on January 15, 1982, in which María Terraza Cedillo, aged eighty, Margarita Terraza Chaves, aged eight, and twelve-year-old Juan Terraza Chaves, were tortured and killed (cb0001143).

The following set of figures shows the number of victims caused by different categories of perpetrators; in other words, the quantitative relationship between victims and victimizers.

Table 1.4
Nebaj, El Quiché
Number of Homicides (Individual Murder, Multiple Murder, Corpse) by Perpetrating Unit and Semester of the Act

Note 1: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Note 2: each violation could have been committed by one or more perpetrators. Therefore, in some cases, the total number of violations by unit is different from the total for individual victims.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH

Table 1.4 demonstrates that the highest number of murders are associated with ground forces of the Guatemalan army. This concurs with the analysis of the political-military context in the region that points to the conduction of large-scale military operations which were supported by the civil patrols, also appearing in this table.

The category "Unknown Men" includes all those perpetrators who could not be identified by their uniform, insignia, or any other distinguishing characteristic. Often, these perpetrators participated in massacres alongside the soldiers and civil patrollers. In other cases they assumed responsibility for carrying out individual assassinations.

In Graph 6, it can be observed that the highest bars correspond to the first half of each year. This concurs with the data provided in other tables and graphs for this municipality. This sequence could be indicative of possible tactical and logistical criteria, such as the fact that the absence of rain, and its attendant natural obstacles, would facilitate the mobilization of large military contingents through the Ixil region, from Ixcán and Uspantán, El Quiché, and Aguacatán and Chiantla, Huehuetenango, where the important military bases were located.

Graph 6
Nebaj, El Quiché
Number of Homicides* by Perpetrating Unit and Semester

* includes individual murders, multiple murders, and corpse(s)
Source: CIIDH, based on Table 1.4

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