Rabinal, Baja Verapaz

The municipality of Rabinal, Baja Verapaz is located in Guatemala’s central plateau region, north of the capital. It encompasses 504 square kilometers. Of the 22,733 inhabitants in 1981, 81.86 per cent were indigenous of the Achi socio-linguistic group; 50.67 per cent were women and 76.42 per cent lived in rural areas. A total of 67.61 per cent of the inhabitants in the municipality were illiterate. The population density was 45.11 inhabitants per square kilometer. Population estimated based on Population Census IX of 1981 estimated the municipality’s 1994 population at 40,931 (DGE: 1981). However, data from Population Census X of 1994 calculated the population in Rabinal at 24,102 for that year (INE: 1995).

Although the results of the last census have been questioned, particularly the absolute figures given, it is interesting to focus on a statistic indicative of the levels state terror reached in Rabinal particularly; that is not observed in the available data for any other municipality in the country. In the period between the two censuses -- nearly fourteen years -- the percentage of women increased markedly. The earlier census indicates that men represented 49.33 per cent of the total population, and women 50.67 per cent, a difference of 1.34 percentage points. Of the total population in 1994, 46.66 per cent were men and 53.34 per cent were women, a difference of 6.68 per cent. This has a dramatic impact on the demographic situation as well as the social dynamics in the community.

Map 7
Location of Rabinal, Baja Verapaz.

Source: CIIDH

As in other rural areas of Guatemala, this municipality has suffered from tremendous exploitation. Although there are no large landholdings in its jurisdiction, the lack of lands is evident in the extremely high level of annual migration by the local population to the Southern Coast, mostly as agricultural labor on the cotton, coffee, and sugarcane plantations. In the northern part of the municipality, some villages are virtually deserted in the months of December and January due to the seasonal coffee harvest in the southwestern bocacosta region of the country.

Rabinal’s incorporation into the national economic structure through its work force occurred early on, with the introduction of coffee. This situation was accompanied by exploitation and abuses which galvanized broad sectors of the population into supporting the 1944 Revolution. Later, they would join the Local Agrarian Committees which formed part of the operative structure of the Agrarian Reform of 1952.

Many community leaders who emerged from this participation later joined the Peasant Leagues and Catholic Action. Others, such as Socorro Sical and Pascual Ixpatá joined the armed movements of the sixties, going on to attain high-level positions in the insurgents’ military structure. The intense poverty and exclusion that characterized Rabinal lead the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) to conduct significant levels of political work in the area from the late sixties to 1975 when the FAR moved to El Petén. The EGP, also involved in political organizing in the area and operating mostly in neighboring areas of Alta Verapaz and El Quiché, took advantage of the relationships that had been established with the local population by the FAR in an attempt to broaden its theater of operations in the southern part of those departments (Díaz-Polanco: 1987).

The EGP presence in the zone coincided with the conflicts brewing in northern Rabinal municipality. These conflicts had to do with the construction of the Chixoy dam, essential to the hydroelectric project of the National Electrical Institute (INDE), which would flood the lands of several communities. Backed by numerous grassroots organizations and the nascent Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC), villagers from Río Negro refused to vacate their lands due to the insufficient compensation offered by INDE (Fernández: 1988). The conflict dragged on for several years during which the community’s level of organization enabled it to denounce nationally and internationally the abuses it suffered.

In this context, constant harassment and violent acts increased, culminating in a massacre, in January 1980, in which several soldiers and policemen killed seven people from the community (EAFG: 1995). At the end of that same month, government security forces raided the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City which had been occupied by a group from the CUC to denounce growing abuses and repression in the Ixil and other areas, including Rabinal. As a result of the police action, thirty-nine people died, including peasants, students, and Embassy staff and visitors. This incident had special repercussions for Rabinal since one of the victims was a representative of local organized peasants.

Following that incident, and for the next eighteen months, violence in Rabinal was applied systematically and selectively, mainly targeting community leaders. The government response to the presence in Rabinal of the CUC; nongovernmental organizations that supported the population’s demands; and the EGP, with a moderate number of sympathizers, was to create a complex intelligence network which supplied most of the information used for selective terror tactics. These included: threats, kidnapping, torture, and assassinations of community leaders perpetrated by military commissioners, G-2 agents, secret agents, and civil patrollers, sometimes individually and in other cases working together.

The following testimony describes the murder of two brothers, ordered by the army and executed by the civil patrol in the village of Nimacabaj, Rabinal, on June 15, 1981:

Following the incident at the Spanish Embassy, the insurgency stepped up its military actions on all fronts. With the insurgents’ advance in several regions and the concurrent modification of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, Rabinal became one of the targets of the strategic offensives launched by the army in July 1981. In contrast to the preceding months, in which selective terror was applied clandestinely (by unidentified individuals, with their faces covered, and in civilian dress), the application of open, large-scale terror tactics commenced (perpetrated by fully identified individuals linked to the army, such as G-2 agents, military commissioners, etc., accompanied by units of uniformed soldiers and/or civil patrollers).

Indiscriminate and widespread repression led a high percentage of the local population to join the organizational structure of the insurgents. However, their participation was limited to political tasks including consciousness-raising "speeches" and later, propagandistic activities. The disproportionate correlation between the level of insurgency reached in Rabinal and the government’s counterinsurgency response is demonstrated by the nearly 5,000 people killed, 40 per cent of which were victims of some twenty massacres committed between 1981 and 1983 (EAFG: 1995).

The testimony of one of the witnesses to the Los Encuentros massacre, committed by a joint operation of soldiers and civil patrollers on May 13 and 14, 1982, demonstrates the high levels of violence employed as well as the excesses committed against the defenseless civilian population:

For the purposes of this analysis, the violent acts suffered by the population of Rabinal are a clear example of the government policy described earlier. The figures that are presented below show that the wave of terror against the population of this municipality lasted from January 1981 to mid-1983. Another aspect confirmed by the information presented here, is the recourse to indiscriminate repressive acts, since selective acts, analyzed, for example, through cases of kidnapping, are quantitatively fewer.

The common denominator of human rights violations in Rabinal is the massacre, used as an operative tool to eliminate large numbers of the population. These incidents were suffered particularly by residents of Río Negro, Canchún, Los Encuentros, Rabinal (municipal seat), La Ceiba, Panacal, Chichupac, Plan De Sánchez, El Sauce, Agua Fría, Xeabaj, Xesiguán, Pichec, Nimacabaj, and Coyajá.

The acts of violence committed in Rabinal were covered fairly regularly by the press from 1976 to early 1982. As in the rest of the country, in April 1982, the censorship imposed by the government made the dissemination of information difficult or impossible in most cases. The relatively broad press coverage of this region was due to the high profile conflict between the community of Rio Negro and INDE. In this regard, the Catholic church and several human rights organizations, together with some members of the press, publicized the massacres shortly after they occurred, mainly in late 1981 and throughout 1982. In contrast, during the same period it was nearly impossible to obtain reliable information about the Ixil region.

The figures in Table 2.1 show the high number of deaths reported by witnesses, primarily in the context of the strategic offensives carried out by the army between 1981 and 1983. There is a marked rise in the number of victims killed from July 1981 on, corresponding to the military operations of "Operación Ceniza." One year later, during "Victoria 82," the number of those killed in massacres increased by nearly 300 per cent.

The information obtained by CIIDH comes, in most cases, from direct witnesses -- massacre survivors. It exposes the main objectives of the counterinsurgency strategy and the incorporation of methods of mass extermination, as suggested by the analysis presented earlier in this report. The high number of fatalities is indicative of the defenselessness of the population, as well as the disproportionate and cruel nature of the military operations waged in this municipality.

Table 2.1
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Victimsof Different Types of Violation, by Semester

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH

The following testimony of the massacre committed in the village of Panacal, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz, on June 15, 1982 mentions some of the factors suggesting the disproportionate nature of the military operations waged against the civilian population, illustrated by the contextual analysis and the figures provided in the tables (scale, premeditation, cruelty, defenselessness of the victims, etc.).

The figures in Table 2.1 also reflect the military dynamics of the offensives and indicate that these offensives began abruptly in January 1981 and reached their peak intensity during 1982. This period coincides with the massacres of Chichupac, Río Negro (twice), and Plan de Sánchez, among many others (EAFG: 1995).

Until recently, the intensity of the repression in Rabinal was little known since the socio-political context characterized by counterinsurgency regards silence as one of the ways of sustaining and perpetuating terror. Thus, most of the details of the political violence was little known outside of the social sphere of the victims. In cases like Rabinal, the level of terror restricted the expression of the trauma caused to the private sphere of the victim (in this case, the witnesses) for years.

This situation, in which impunity has branded all social relationships, produced a "pseudo-normal" social relationship between victims and victimizers. This precluded the socialization of the traumatic experiences suffered by the community in the immediate past. It was only through the organization of a group of widows and orphans that, supported by GAM, CONAVIGUA and other human rights organizations, three exhumations in the municipality were requested and were supported. Other victims subsequently decided to share the tragedy they had experienced.

Graph 7 shows the increase in massacres from July 1980 until they reached their peak strength between July and December 1982, during which time several of the largest massacres in the municipality occurred (EAFG: 1995).

Graph 7
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Victims of Multiple Murders, by Semester

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 2.1

During the second half of 1982, acts of mass terror increased in all Rabinal communities. Numerous massacres were committed causing the flight of thousands of peasants to other regions of Guatemala. Graph 8 shows that 45 per cent of massacre victims were caused during the second half of 1982 during operations associated with "Victoria 82."

Graph 8
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Vicitms of Multiple Murders by Semester (%)

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 2.1

In Graph 9 the number of male and female victims of individual assassinations can be compared. In contrast to Nebaj, in this case the majority of victims occurred during the second half of 1981 and 1982 (see Graph 3).

In Rabinal, acts of selective repression usually were carried out by civilians linked to the army, such as secret agents (confidenciales), military commissioners, or civil patrol chiefs. As can be observed in the next graph (Graph 9), numerous assassinations of women have been documented by CIIDH relative to the other municipalities studied. This indicates a higher degree of indiscriminate acts, despite the tendency to eliminate male leadership.

Repressive acts against women usually consisted of threats, kidnapping, rape, and torture, used as a warning, and also to perpetuate the climate of terror. However, there are numerous cases in which women were killed after having suffered other types of violations. Such a case is described in the following testimony in which the victims, all women, were raped and then killed by soldiers acting in conjunction with civil patrollers, G-2 agents, judiciales [deputies], and military commissioners. This took place during the Plan de Sánchez massacre on July 18, 1982:

This case is one of mass terror, in which the quantitative differences between male and female victims is markedly reduced. This type of repression does not seek to warn or discourage the targeted groups or communities. The main objective is to eliminate potential insurgent collaborators and as such, does not discriminate among victims according to gender or age.

The massacres in Rabinal generally were committed by civilian members of the civil patrols in conjunction with units of uniformed members of the army. The most violent periods coincide with the progress of the strategic offensives launched by the army in 1981 and 1982. Table 2.2 summarized the percentage of male victims of each type of violation.

Table 2.2
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Percentage Male of Victims by Semester and by Type of Violation

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH; based on Table 2.1

The following graph presents the high number of women assassinated in the context of the open and large-scale terror that characterized the counterinsurgency strategy between 1981 and 1983. From July to December 1982, the Plan de Sánchez massacre was committed, with an estimated toll of 278 victims. This study has not yet incorporated information about this and other massacres committed in the municipality.

Graph 9
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Percentage Masculine by Semester

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 2.2

The indiscriminate nature of the massacres is reflected in the high percentage of women killed relative to other municipalities studied. As can be observed, the information processed indicate that mass terror caused a lower proportion of male victims relative to female victims than did selective terror. From July to December 1982, the percentage of women killed in the massacres is equivalent to that of men. This coincides with the operations associated with "Victoria 82" during which the Plan de Sánchez massacre occurred, among others.

The information that follows provide the age of the victims and, as is apparent in Table 2.3., violent actions were mostly directed at adults. However, in the case of massacres or multiple murders, the number of minors and elderly increases, in part due to the mass, indiscriminate nature of such incidents. The probable objective was to affect traditional community organization in which the family plays a central role. With the killing of children, adults, and the elderly, the immediate harm and the subsequent impact affect at least three generations in terms of intra- and inter- family relationships, inter-community relationships, and the economic activities of the community (Alecio: 1995).

Table 2.3
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Victims by Age Category and Type of Violation

Note: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH, based on Table 2.1

It is worth recalling that the figures provided in this report are neither absolute nor definitive, and comprise only a small sample of the levels of State violence visited on Rabinal. One example of this is the massacre of 107 children and seventy women committed in the village of Rio Negro on March 13, 1982. (EAFG: 1995). The data on this massacre are still being entered into the CIIDH data base.

Graph 10 shows the relationship between acts of violence and the age of the victims.

Graph 10
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Victims by Age Range

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 2.3

One important characteristic of the terror in Rabinal is the involvement of the civilian population, through civil patrols, military commissioners, or spontaneous army collaborators in the commission of different types of violations. One of the goals of the counterinsurgency strategy was to break down community structures by dividing the population into victims and victimizers.

Table 2.4 summarizes figures indicating the relationship between victims and victimizers. As can be observed, most of the accusations regarding violations are against uniformed army units, civil patrollers, judiciales, army collaborators, and military commissioners.

Table 2.4
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Homicides (Individual Murder, Multiple Murder, Corpse) by Perpetrating Unit and Semester of the Act

Note 1: this table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname..
Note 2: each violation could have been committed by one or more perpetrators. Therefore, in some cases, the total number of violations by unit is different from the total for individual victims.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH

With the exception of soldiers, most of the other groups of perpetrators appearing in Table 2.4 consist of people residing in the same communities as the victims, or in neighboring communities. Nearly all of the testimonies about massacres and other violations in Rabinal included the names of, and other information about, perpetrators. The latter usually had a daily relationship with the victims (EAFG: 1995).

In Graph 11, the highest bar for the period of January 1981 to December 1982 represents the category of "Unknown men," which includes all perpetrators who could not be identified in the moment of the violation, in this case, murders.

In the case of Rabinal, it has been possible to determine that civil patrollers, military commissioners, and some other collaborators participated in the massacres in villages other than their own, covering their faces, changing some of their clothing, and using a red bandana tied around the shoulder to identify themselves. On some occasions, different witnesses have asserted that they recognized some of the perpetrators, but, in the absence of positive confirmation, such cases were placed in this category.

Graph 11
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz
Number of Homicides* by Perpetrating Unit and Semester

* includes individual murders, multiple murders, and corpse(s)
Note: only the perpetrators with the most victims in the three municipalities appear.
Source: CIIDH, based 0n Table 2.4

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