
Chapter 4: State Terror in Three Guatemalan Regions
The municipality of Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez, in the departamento of Suchitepéquez, is located in an export agricultural zone producing coffee, sugarcane, cotton, and cacao, as well as livestock. It has a geographical range of 242 square kilometers with an altitude ranging from sea level on the Pacific coast to the area known as the Bocacosta rising to nearly 400 meters above sea level.
Population Census IX of 1981 reported the municipality’s population at 20,984 inhabitants, of which 57.97 per cent were of Mayan origin, belonging to the Kakchiquel, Tzutuhil and Quiché socio-linguistic groups (DGE: 1981). The urban population accounts for barely 11.65 per cent, and 50.79 per cent of the total population were men; 62.99 per cent of the population was illiterate. This census estimated that the 1995 population would reach 36,839, of which only 9.83 per cent would live in urban areas, and 90.17 per cent in rural areas. Population Census X of 994 reported 27,948 inhabitants as of April of that year (INE: 1995).
Map 8
Location of
Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez

Source: CIIDH
In the late seventies, the Southern Coast had become the focal point for the organization of rural workers, due to the fact that large landholdings for agro-export were concentrated there and hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers flowed into the area from the highland region. Estimates are that, in the early eighties, seasonal agricultural migration brought some 600,000 workers from the highlands to the southern region of the country (Jonas: 1994). As stated earlier, the seasonal presence in the region of this number of mostly indigenous semi-proletariat farm workers meant that organizational processes around economic and social demands expanded in regions farthest from the highlands.
During the sixties and seventies, a significant process of semi-proletarization of the countryside occurred: agro-exporters did not need a full time, permanent labor force, but rather one that was permanently available to work part-time. This situation meant deteriorating standards of living for thousands of families who were reduced to income levels insufficient for subsistence. As stated earlier, because of the economic characteristics and political interests of the landowners, the logic of governmental repression in this region was less extravagant than in the highlands, although similar in intensity and consistency.
According to the information collected, it is possible to conclude that human rights violations in this municipality were usually committed on an individual basis. The fact that Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez borders the bocacosta region and the Southern coast shaped the nature of repressive acts.
The existence of an extensive road network, the relative ease of communications with Guatemala City, and the productive nature of the zone, among other factors, also explains why the incidents occurring in the area reported by the media repeatedly refer to "unidentified heavily-armed individuals." In other words, these are the activities of what we have termed "irregular forces," or death squads. Nonetheless, in some cases, witnesses did not hesitate to accuse members of the army as the perpetrators of human rights violations, as shown in the testimonies appearing below. The testimonies describe several cases of kidnapping, torture, and individual killing perpetrated in the municipality of Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez on October 21, 1981, August 14, 1982, and February 28, 1983, respectively.
Pedro A.* was kidnapped by several heavily-armed men; they threatened him and forced him to walk with them to where they had parked the car. Mr. Pedro did not belong to any organization, his crime was having given shelter to Mr. Mateo J.* whom the army accused of being a guerrilla. For this reason, I think it was the army. From all accounts, Don Pedro was kidnapped and to date no one knows anything about him (Case narrative cf0000093). *names changed
Rene F.* was kidnapped by the army from the detachment in Belen, Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez...there are twelve soldiers, but they hid their identity ...Luisa G.* also was a victim because they put the weapon to her forehead and they robbed her of a check good for the purchase of a truckload of rice and some cash. Two weeks later they came to ask for two truckloads of corn and a truckload of rice and they told the woman that they were guerrillas and that’s why they asked for corn and rice, but the woman knows them, that they are from the army, and that’s why she asked them for her husband, but they said they didn’t know anything and they hit the woman again (Case narrative cf0000156). *names changed
The victim was sleeping with his family when ten unknown men arrived, six of them heavily armed and in camouflage uniforms. They entered the house and told him to get out and when he left they beat him with the weapons they were carrying; after that they took him saying that he would be their guide to search the village of San Juan. They took him and he never reappeared (Case narrative cj0000093).
The victims were usually peasants living on the periphery of the agro-export plantations, although some were indigenous who had migrated to the sugarcane cutting or coffee harvest.
The common denominator of terror in this municipality lies in its selectivity; most of the violent actions were committed individually. Further, it is important to emphasize the clandestinity preserved by the perpetrators, who routinely acted during the night. This is illustrated in the following cases, related by witnesses, which occurred in different communities of Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez on March 22, 1982; December 4, 1982; and December 26, 1982.
Don Miguel S.* was kidnapped by unknown men. When they took him by force, these unknown men were not identified because it was night when they took him. The unknown men carried shoulder weapons but the type and caliber is not known because it was nighttime. That was how Don Miguel was kidnapped.... (Case narrative cf0000104). *Name changed
Mr. Carlos D.* was kidnapped from his home in canton Copadito, Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez. Unknown men arrived and forced the door of his house and Don Carlos said to them ‘Sirs, do not ruin the door, I will open it,’ and he got out of his bed and went to open it. That was when they grabbed him and they told him ‘you’ll come with us and you’re going to show us the way;’ since then he has never returned home. Before arriving at his house, they [the men] also took another neighbor. What is certain is that six men disappeared from the area that night (Case narrative cf0000143). *Name changed
They took Mr. Francisco E.* At eleven at night, a group of unknown people passed close by his house and they went to look for the neighbor at the house beyond and when they did not find him, they came to Mr. Francisco E.’s house...when he opened the door, they kicked him and threw him to the floor, they pointed their weapons at him and they asked him about the other person who was a youth...they took him away. The assassins killed him, but they did not torture him...his body did not have signs of torture...There were a lot of men, but in the dark it was impossible to tell who they were and how many killers came to take him away kidnapped that night, to kill him (Case narrative cf0000094). *Name changed
Table 3.1 summarizes the information culled from testimonies about Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez during the period indicated. Like other regions in Guatemala, acts of violence increased during the eighteen-month period between July 1981 and December 1982. Most of the information gathered about this municipality describes kidnapping victims and individual murders. Other types of violations are reported less frequently or do not appear, such as the case of multiple murders.
Table 3.1
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number of Victims of Different Types of Violation, by
Semester
|
Type of violation |
1980: Jul-Dec |
1981: Jan-Jun |
1981: Jul-Dec |
1982: Jan-Jun |
1982: Jul-Dec |
1983: Jan-Jun |
1983: Jul-Dec |
1984: Jan-Jun |
Total |
|
individual murder |
3 |
6 |
3 |
2 |
14 |
||||
|
corpse |
2 |
4 |
6 |
||||||
|
dis- appearance |
3 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
8 |
||||
|
kidnapping |
4 |
2 |
6 |
5 |
4 |
1 |
22 |
||
|
torture |
1 |
1 |
2 |
Note: this
table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH
As can be observed, in contrast to the cases from Nebaj and Rabinal, the substantial number of kidnapping in Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez is indicative of the selective nature of the terror employed in this region. This was even the case when the strategic offensive "Victoria 82" was in progress, in which massacres and scorched earth operations were emphasized in other parts of the country, such as the highland region.
The use of terror in the zone was characterized by acts of violence targeting specific individuals, possibly community, labor, or peasant leadership. Kidnapping as a form of repression sought to terrorize the immediate victim and others in the victims social, work, or family circles. A high percentage of the kidnapping committed in Guatemala led to the murder of the victims, although there were many cases in which victims survived.
In this regard, a comparison of the figures on the most frequent types of violations in Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez, based on the information collected -- kidnapping and individual murders -- lead one to infer that kidnapping did not always result in the death of the victims. This supports the hypothesis that repression in this area was, to an extent, "preventive" in nature, during the period studied. Graph 12 shows the evolution of kidnapping from 1980-1984.
Graph 12
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number of Victims of Kidnapping by Semester

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 3.1
Graph 13 illustrates the percentage of kidnapping victims by time period, with a marked increase during 1982 in the context of generalized terror throughout the country.
Concurring with the trend visible in Graph 12, Figueroa Ibarra and the Guatemalan Church in Exile offer data supporting the increase in terror in Suchitepéquez during 1982 and part of 1983 (Figueroa Ibarra: 1991, IGE:1995).
Graph 13
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Victims of Kidnapping by Semester (%)

Source: CIIDH, based on Table 3.1
The following tables and graphs present percentages that demonstrate the relationship between types of violations and the gender of the victims. Table 3.2 summarizes data regarding the percentage of men who were victims of different violations for each of the periods analyzed.
Table 3.2
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Percentage Male of Victims by Semester and by Type of
Violation
|
Type of violation |
1980: Jul-Dec |
1981: Jan-Jun |
1981: Jul-Dec |
1982: Jan-Jun |
1982: Jul-Dec |
1983: Jan-Jun |
1983: Jul-Dec |
1984: Jan-Jun |
|
individual murder |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||||
|
multiple murder |
||||||||
|
corpse |
100 |
100 |
||||||
|
disappearance |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||||
|
kidnapping |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
75 |
100 |
||
|
torture |
100 |
100 |
Note: this
table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH, based on
Table 3.1
Graph 14 illustrates the percentages of men who were kidnapped and assassinated individually. An analysis of the bar graph reveals that, with the exception of the first half of 1983, all of the cases of violations targeted males. The selectivity of terror in this zone was more precise and specifically targeted leaders or local people who presumably could report to the government security forces regarding potential organizational or insurgent movements in certain cases. As stated earlier, almost all of these people were men.
Graph 14
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Percentage Masuline by Semester

Note: only
victims identified by at least one given name and one family name are included.
Source: CIIDH, based on Table 3.2
The data indicate that 100% of the individual murders during the period studied targeted men. Further, kidnapping victims were also males in nearly every case. (Note that in Table 3.1 there were no victims of either kind of violation in July-Dec. 1980 nor in July-Dec 1983.) This confirms the hypothesis regarding the selective criteria used by the perpetrators in this part of the country.
Selectivity, in this case, focused on adults with the potential for social involvement. The following testimony includes elements that underscore the assumptions made regarding the criteria used to apply terror in this municipality. The case is one in which the perpetrators identify and capture a specific victim. It occurred on Las Campañas Farm, Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez on March 22, 1981.
Ten well-armed, and completely masked men came to the house of Mr. Adolfo O.* around nine o’clock at night and they knocked on the door of the house and when no one opened it they started hitting it to break it down...Mrs. Laura O., daughter of the deceased, decided to open the door, putting herself in God’s hands...they told her husband to put on his pants and shirt, but the woman told the men that if they were going to kill her husband to do it there, to do it in front of her, and then the man who was farthest back said ‘that’s not him’ and then the woman’s father came out and they immediately took him away (Case narrative cf0000096). *Names changed
This story shows how the perpetrators acted as a group using all available forms of intimidation. However, although it is obvious that they could have killed or kidnapped the first man, their objective was well-defined and when the victim had been identified, they proceeded to take him away. In this type of kidnapping, the threat against the rest of the family or social group is always latent, since the victimizers clearly demonstrate the practically unlimited power they wield in the community or the region.
Table 3.3
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number of Victims by Age Category and Type of Violation
|
Type of violation |
Minor <17 years |
Adult 17-60 years |
Elderly >60 years |
Age unknown |
Total |
|
individual murder |
11 |
3 |
14 |
||
|
multiple murder |
|||||
|
corpse |
5 |
1 |
6 |
||
|
disappearance |
6 |
2 |
8 |
||
|
kidnapping |
1 |
16 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
Note: this
table includes only victims identified by at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Source:
testimonies given to the CIIDH, based on Table 3.1
Graph 15 shows the criterion of selectivity that characterized the use of terror in Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez. Because of the economic characteristics of this region, it is likely that the government sought to maintain control through low-profile tactical operations, although their impact on the population is as great as that caused by act of mass terror. Selective terror does not make a victim of everyone, but it makes everyone a potential victim.
Graph 15
Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number of Victims by Age Range
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH, based on Table 3.3
In the majority of the cases, the immunity and impunity of the perpetrators is emphasized in order to maintain an atmosphere of terror and a general sense of vulnerability among the population. The generalization of repression in some cases led perpetrators to act in public places, in daylight, and with clothing easily identifiable by the population. The following testimony describes one such case, witnessed by many people in Mazatenango, Suchitepéquez on December 17, 1982.
Luis P.* left his house in canton Cancín, Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez at eight o’clock in the morning, in the direction of Mazatenango. He was in market number one, accompanied by his wife who was selling chilies. At twelve noon, three men arrived wearing white t-shirts -- I don’t remember the color of their pants -- and camouflage hats, and they grabbed Luis and they shackled him, and they took him to the detachment in Mazatenango in front of the Central Park. After nine o’clock at night they arrived at the victim’s home in a gray Pick-up. Several men banged on the door and his wife opened it. The victim was with them, with his hands tied and there was something heavy attached to his feet because he could not take a step. He talked to the woman and told her to open the door and he asked the men to please not frighten his children. Then, approximately twenty armed men with their faces covered went into the house. One of them shot at the roof, and another stole fifteen thousand quetzales they had saved, and they also took dishes, machetes, and everything they could.... (Case narrative cf0000515). *Name changed
The following information describes the perpetrators of the violations.
Table 3.4
Santo Domingo
Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number of Homicides (Individual Murder, Multiple Murder,
Corpse) by Perpetrating Unit and Semester of the Act
|
Perpetrating Unit |
1980: Jul-Dec |
1981: Jan-Jun |
1981: Jul-Dec |
1982: Jan-Jun |
1982: Jul-Dec |
1983: Jan-Jun |
1983: Jul-Dec |
1984: Jan-Jun |
|
Army/ infantry |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
||||
|
Air Force |
1 |
|||||||
|
Military commissioner |
||||||||
|
G-2 Military intelligence |
1 |
|||||||
|
Unknown - Civilian dress |
3 |
5 |
2 |
|||||
|
Unknown - uniformed |
2 |
1 |
2 |
|||||
|
Kaibiles |
||||||||
|
Civil Patrol |
||||||||
|
Paramilitary |
||||||||
|
National Police |
||||||||
|
Judicial police*** |
1 |
|||||||
|
Collaborator/ informer |
||||||||
|
Guerrillas/ subversives |
||||||||
|
Foreign military |
||||||||
|
Disguised |
1 |
1 |
||||||
|
Unknown |
2 |
3 |
||||||
|
Other |
Note 1: this table includes only victims identified by
at least 1 name and 1 surname.
Note 2: each violation could have been committed
by one or more perpetrators. Therefore, in some cases, the total number of violations
by unit is different from the total for individual victims.
Source: testimonies given to the CIIDH
As can be observed, in both Table 2.4 and Graph 16 witnesses in this municipality mention only seven categories of perpetrators, out of eighteen mentioned in other municipalities. This is due to the concentration of counterinsurgency functions in the hands of the army and the "irregular forces" or death squads, consistent with the characteristics of the region.
Graph 16 clearly shows that the only bars that appear represent identifiable military units, unknown men, and judiciales. This is consistent with the way in which repression was applied in this part of the country. The army did not conduct large-scale operations such as those in the highlands, using instead smaller groups of intelligence agents of a clandestine nature. As seen in the testimonies presented earlier, victims often recognized the perpetrators or linked them to military detachments or units located in their area of residence or employment.
Graph 16
Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez, Suchitepéquez
Number
of Homicides* by Perpetrating Unit and Period

* homicides include individual murders, multiple murders, and
corpse(s)
Note: only the perpetrators with the most
victims in the three municipalities appear.
Source: CIIDH, based on Table 3.4
